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In this paper the recent effect of the European Monetary Union on inward FDI-flows 
is examined. We use a difference-in-differences approach for both a gravity based- as 
well as a general equilibrium approach. The estimated results show that the 
introduction of the euro raises inward FDI by 14 to 16 percent within the euro area by 
11 to 13 percent from non-member and weakly by 8 percent to non-member countries. 
Moreover the geographical effects of the euro are explored. The results show partial 
agglomeration tendencies for the euro area. There are also some indications of 
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A large body of empirical literature on the e⁄ects of EMU on trade is now
forming, following the seminal paper by Rose (2000). These include Bun and Klaasen
(2002), Barr et al. (2003), Micco et al. (2003) and Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003).
Their results show that EMU has increased trade volume by a magnitude ranging
between 15 and 38 percent. Moreover, this increase in trade has not been con￿ned
to member states only, but has extended to non-member countries as well.
This paper will address an interrelated issue, namely whether EMU has had any
e⁄ects on foreign direct investment (FDI) ￿ ows. FDI ￿ ows can be considered to be
interrelated with trade since, at least at the theoretical level, such ￿ ows are often
viewed either as a substitute for trade (horizontal FDI) or as a complement to trade
(vertical FDI). In addition, it can give an indication of whether EMU creates better
conditions for ￿rms making long-term investment decisions. One argument against
￿ oating currencies is that higher exchange rate variability creates uncertainty that
discourages international investment and trade. Fixing the exchange rate eliminates
this risk, hence encouraging international investment and trade, as well as making
￿rms cost calculations and pricing decisions easier. Adopting a single currency is
a very credible commitment to exchange rate stability and has the advantage of
reducing transaction costs that would otherwise occur, irrespective of the degree of
volatility. Both e⁄ects should promote international investment, i.e. FDI ￿ ows.
In spite of the intuitive appeal of the argument that lower exchange rate volatility
will increase FDI ￿ ows, empirical evidence regarding the e⁄ects of EMU on FDI
￿ ows, is currently absent.1 The approach of this paper is novel since little or no
research, to my knowledge, has been devoted to appraising the e⁄ects of EMU on
FDI ￿ows. From a broader perspective, the recent economic and policy debate,
concerning the economic e⁄ects of EMU on its member states, has been based on
an increasing body of empirical evidence and this paper is an attempt to investigate
yet another aspect of EMU.
We use a new dataset on FDI ￿ ows, a panel of unilateral FDI ￿ ows between
18 developed countries for the years 1992 to 2001 is gathered. Since we are trying
to uncover potential e⁄ects of an institutional reform, a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
approach suitable for identifying such structural changes, is used to gauge the e⁄ects
of EMU on inward FDI. The estimations are carried out both within a partial as
well as a general equilibrium approach to FDI. The results of this study show that
1A partial exception is Barr et al. (2003) that present some stylized facts concerning European FDI ￿ows.
5EMU increases inward FDI ￿ ows within the euro area by approximately 14 to 16
percent, inward FDI from member countries to non-members by 11 to 13 percent
and a weak increase in inward FDI from non-member countries to member countries
of around 8 percent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 some stylized
facts and basic concepts concerning FDI are presented. Section 3 discusses the
data, and Section 4 considers the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the
main results, whereas Section 6 deals with the robustness of these results. Section
7 combines trade and FDI data in order to examine potential economic geography
e⁄ects of the euro. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Basic concepts and stylized facts
An FDI is a cross-border investment made by an investor with the intent of
obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another country.2 In principle,
when a ￿rm wishes to make sales abroad it has a variety of methods that can
be employed, such as exporting, licensing, appointing agents or engaging in direct
investment. FDIs are an equivalent to producing directly in the country one wishes
to serve.
In latter years, FDI has become an increasingly important factor in the global
economic activity, with growth rates for world FDI ￿ ows that, by far, exceed those
of GDP or trade (Table 1). This is true even in spite of the large drop that world
FDI ￿ ows experienced at the turn of the millennium.
Another interesting feature of the FDI ￿ ows is that they have been primarily
concentrated to developed economies (Table 2), which received about 70 percent
of world in￿ ows during the ￿ 90s, and which, after several recent ￿nancial crises in
developing countries, subsequently increased their share to more than 80 percent.3
2According to Eurostat, who follow the OECD benchmark de￿nition of FDI (third edition), an international
investment is classed as FDI when an investor owns ten percent or more of ordinary shares or voting rights in an
incorporated or unincorporated enterprise abroad.
3With the majority of FDI in￿ows, 40 percent, to developing countries going to China. The developed countries
share of world out￿ows is of course even higher, ranging between 85 to 95 percent. See Markusen 2002, Ch. 1.
6Table 1
World Growth in FDI, Trade and GDP
Period growth rates %, current US$
1992-96 1996-2001 1992-2001 1992-2000
FDI, In￿ ows 78.7 70.5 154.7 236.4
Exports and Imports 34.6 14.2 48.9 52.6
GDP per capita 5.4 6.8 12.2 12.3
GDP PPP, current 0.2 0.22 0.42 0.4
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
Table 2
FDI In￿ ows, percent of world in￿ ows
High Income Middle Income Low Income
In￿ ows In￿ ows In￿ ows
1992-97 67.4 30.5 2.1
1998-02 80.4 18.2 1.4
2003-04 69.5 28.9 2.6
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
The existence of FDI has several major explanations. One type is market oriented,
where FDI gives companies access to foreign markets thus acting as a substitute for
trade; this is the so called horizontal FDI. Another rationale for FDI is production
oriented and driven by cost minimizing objectives, where global companies gain
strategic advantage by shifting low paid jobs abroad while keeping high value added
research at home thereby producing either parts of or the entire ￿nal product in
low-cost areas; this is the so called vertical FDI. Finally, a third rationale implies
that the mode of outsourcing depends on the market structure, where oligopolistic or
monopolistic markets have pro￿ts, while competitive markets have lower costs. The
distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is a theoretical construct.4 A ￿rm
engaging in horizontal FDI is said to sell its products solely in the foreign market,
while a vertical FDI serves the home market. It is a construct insofar as no FDI
acts solely as either and the debate about whether most FDI act as if they were
horizontal or vertical is not settled.
From a theoretical perspective two main areas are at the forefront of the litera-
ture on FDI. The ￿rst explores the rationale behind the existence and consequences
of multinational activity within a general equilibrium framework.5 This consists,
4See Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2003).
5See Brainard (1997), Carr et al. (2001), Bloningen et al. (2003), Ekholm et al. (2003), Baltagi et al. (2005) for
speci￿c models and Bloningen (2005) for an overview.
7mainly, of attempts to incorporate FDI into the new trade theory of economic ge-
ography and the models focus primarily on real factors of production. Questions
concerning capital ￿ ows, i.e. the ￿nancing decisions of the ￿rms are believed to
be largely separable from decisions regarding the location of production and the
direction of trade. The second focuses on ideas stemming from industrial organiza-
tion theory, where FDI are studied with endogenous ￿rm organizations and general
equilibrium models of industrial structures.6
From the perspective of empirical analysis, there are again two main areas of
research. The ￿rst concerns the determinants of FDI and can be derived either from
a speci￿c model or created in a more ad hoc manner,7 and the second concerns
the consequences of FDI on the economic environment.8 Another bifurcation in
the empirical literature occurs in the choice of FDI data, with researchers either
using plant-level panel microdata or FDI ￿ ows from the balance of payments (BoP).
The former data is subject to smaller measurement errors, though its international
availability is strictly limited. This forces us to turn to the latter data which is
subject to larger measurement errors but is more readily available. Since the question
to be addressed here is whether the European currency union has had an e⁄ect on
FDI ￿ ows, a panel data approach is used. We utilize a coherent dataset of BoP FDI
￿ ows from Eurostat that covers 18 countries for the years 1992-2001.
3 Data
Eurostat provides satisfactory data for bilateral and unilateral FDI for the eigh-
teen reporting economies. Total FDI ￿ ows are divided into three general subcate-
gories, namely: Equity, Other Capital and Reinvested Earnings, with the third part
showing gaps in availability due to misreporting. Hence in this paper the FDI ￿ ows
refer to Equity and Other Capital. All FDI ￿ ows are net ￿ ows, where net does
not imply a net between a country pair (FDIij ￿ FDIji) but implies rather, net of
disinvestment.
Following the FDI and trade literature, these kind of regressions are usually con-
ducted on bilateral data, but in order to increase the observations to two for each
country pair in the empirical speci￿cation one-way FDI ￿ ows will be used, de￿ned
as inward FDI ￿ows, where an investment in country i from country j is represented
as FDIij and is viewed as an inward FDI from country i0s perspective. The inves-
6Grossman and Helpman (2002 a, b), Puga and Tre￿er (2002).
7See Braunerhjelm and Ekholm (1998), Chakrabarti (2001), Markusen (2002) and Bloningen (2005).
8See Keller 2001 for an overview.
8tigation in this paper entails a panel of 18 OECD countries, hence (18 ￿ 17) = 306
country pairs, with yearly data spanning the period 1992-2001. However, country
i0s inward FDI can of course, be measured in two di⁄erent ways. That is, either
the recipient country, i, reports an in￿ ow from country j or the investing country,
j, reports an out￿ ow to country i. In an ideal world it would be an identity, but in
practise there often is a di⁄erence in reported values, even at aggregate world level,
between in￿ ows and out￿ ows and there are no indications that one is "better" re-
ported than the other. It is thus prudent to try and ameliorate any e⁄ects stemming
from this di⁄erence.
Two attempts to correct this measurement error are made in this paper. First,
if the ￿ true￿value of FDI ￿ ows lie somewhere between country i0s reported in￿ ows
and country j0s reported out￿ ows, it is possible to improve the estimation by taking
an average of the two series, we call this Average. Moreover, in order not to lose
many observations, since in￿ ows and out￿ ows have di⁄erent missing values, it has
to be done stepwise by ￿rstly approximating missing data on in￿ ows by their out-
￿ ow counterpart, if available.9 This approximation is done by dividing the sample
into three major entities, Europe, USA, Japan, calculating an average asymmetry
between these and correcting each of the missing points by their average asymme-
try. The new variables that are created are In￿ows Corr and Out￿ows Corr. The
results obtained from these "corrected" series mirror those obtained from the raw
data series which allows us to move on to the second step and take an average of the
two new series, hence creating a new variable called Average Corr. In the second
approach we use out￿ ows (in￿ ows) to instrument for in￿ owsij (out￿ ows), which will
give us consistent estimates even if measurement errors are present. The drawback
of instrumenting is as usual the loss of e¢ ciency in the estimations.10
Another issue with the data is caused by the erratic nature of FDI ￿ ows between
any country pair. In our case where FDI ￿ ows are reported in millions of current
US dollars, many ￿ ows can be, and are, negative due to disinvestment. The neg-
ative values in the dependent variable precludes a conversion of the data set into
a logarithmic scale. However, it is still possible to obtain elasticities for the point
estimates, since the predicted means are positive values, by using the chain rule.
This enables us to obtain a clear picture of the magnitude of the e⁄ect due to the
introduction of the euro.11
9See Appendix I and Appendix III Table A for methodological issues on asymmetries.
10The results of and discussion conserning these attempts are found in Appendix III.
11Logs of FDI are used many times in the litterature, usually when sales of multinational enterprises are used as a
proxy for FDI. Here log form estimations are conducted both by simply converting the series into logs as well as by
using a Heckman two-step approach. The results are presented in Appendix III Tables C1 and C2. Even if logging
94 Empirical speci￿cation
The introduction of the Euro can be viewed as a sharp change in the economic
environment of the a⁄ected countries. This change makes it appropriate for us to use
a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences strategy. The idea behind this estimation strategy is to
assess the e⁄ect of the introduction of the euro on inward FDI for the euro-countries,
while keeping the e⁄ects for all other time-invariant variables, as well as common
and country speci￿c time-varying e⁄ects constant, whether these are observables or
unobservables.12 A general speci￿cation of this model can be expressed as:
FDIij;t = ￿ij + ￿t + ￿0Xij;t + ￿EMUij;t + "ij;t
where the dependent variable is FDIij;t in millions of current US dollars. On the
right hand side the explanatory variables include dummies to control for unobserv-
able e⁄ects, speci￿cally a country pair e⁄ect that is ￿xed over time (￿ij), in order
to control for time-invariant unobservables, and a time e⁄ect that is common to all
countries (￿t), in order to control for time-speci￿c unobservables. The set of ex-
planatory variables (Xij;t) comprises a constant and a subset of variables that have
been found, in one way or another, to be signi￿cant in explaining FDI ￿ ows in prior
empirical investigations.13
In the gravity regression approach these variables include measures of market size
for each country Yit and Yjt that are represented by GDP in current millions of
US dollars. Other variables in the set include a measure of capital- or ￿nancing
ability for country j measured as country j￿ s stockmarket value of listed companies,
Stockjt and, in the hope that we might capture potential forward looking elements, a
measure of payo⁄for investing in country i that is measured as the percentage change
in country i￿ s stockmarket value of listed companies, ￿Stockit. Since the dependent
variable is "one-way" FDI, a real exchange rate index is needed for country i and
j, denoted by REXit and REXjt. The close link between trade and FDI suggests
a measure of trade costs, de￿ned as the inverse of trade openness from Penn World
Tables, for both country i and country j, Tradeci and Tradecj to be used.
In the general equilibrium approach, the derived empirical speci￿cation of Carr,
Markusen and Maskus (2001), henceforth (CMM), as well as the corrections pro-
posed by Bloningen, Davies and Head (2003), henceforth (BDH), is used. The
the series reduces both the skewness and kurtosis of the estimated errors, see Bloningen and Davies (2004), some of
the results obtained are improbable casting doubt on the log speci￿cation.
12See Angrist and Krueger (1999).
13See Brainard (1997) and Bloningen (2005). See also Chakrabarti (2001) for an overview and an extreme
boundary analysis of the determinants.
10explanatory variables capturing the long-run determinants of FDI are: the sum of
the country-pair￿ s current GDP, Ysum, the squared di⁄erence of GDP, Y d2, the skill
di⁄erence of labor, skd, which is measured as the di⁄erence in average number of
years in school, the interaction term of skill di⁄erence and GDP di⁄erence, skd￿Y d,
country i￿ s investment cost, Invci which is approximated by a composite index of
bureaucracy, corruption and rule of law from the International Country Risk Guide,
the trade cost for country i and j, as above, Tradeci and Tradecj, and ￿nally the
interaction between trade costs and the square of skill di⁄erence, Tradecj ￿ skd2.14
Finally, we have our variables of interest, EMUij;t, with the accompanying vector
of estimates (￿) that capture the e⁄ect of the euro for the euro-area countries.
The (EMUij;t) are time-varying dummies which take the value of zero prior to the
introduction of the euro in 1999 or in the case of non-membership in the euro-area
and one otherwise. There are three such dummy variables of primary interest here:
one for inward FDI ￿ ows from a euro countries to other euro countries (EMU11), one
for inward FDI ￿ ows to euro countries from non-euro countries (EMU12) and one
for inward FDI ￿ ows from euro countries to non-euro countries (EMU21). Hence we
have three groups of countries and the point estimates of these variables represent
the average e⁄ect of the introduction of the euro. The control group is in this case
represented by EMU(22) which is inward FDI ￿ ows from non-euro countries to other
non-euro countries and as such, EMU(22) is a vector of zeros and does not appear
in the speci￿cation.15
All our speci￿cation also include dummy variables that capture the EU￿ s common
market e⁄ect, both for EU12 (EU12in, EU12out) as well as for Austria, Sweden and
Finland (ASFin, ASFout). The EU12 dummy is zero in 1992 and one thereafter,
while the ASF dummy takes a value of one after 1995. Hence the full model to be
estimated is, in the gravity approach case:
FDIij;t = ￿ij + ￿t + ￿0 + ￿1Yi;t + ￿2Yjt + ￿3Stockj;t + ￿4￿Stockj;t
+ ￿5Tradeci;t + ￿6Tradecj;t + ￿7REXi;t + ￿8REXj;t + ￿9EMU11ij;t
+ ￿10EMU12ij;t + ￿11EMU21ij;t + ￿12EU12inij;t + ￿13EU12outij;t
+ ￿14ASFinij;t + ￿15ASFoutij;t + "ij;t
in the general equilibrium case:16
14The di⁄erence between CMM and BDH is that some variables appear in absolute di⁄erence.
15A more precise description of the variables used in the regressions along with sources and construction, can be
found in Appendices I and II.
16The di⁄erence between CMM￿ s general equilibrium case and BDH￿ s is that the latter has the skill variables in
11FDIij;t = ￿ij + ￿t + ￿0 + ￿1Ysum;t + ￿2Y d
2
t + ￿3skdt + ￿4skdt ￿ Y dt
+ ￿5Tradeci;t + ￿6Tradecj;t + ￿7Invci;t + ￿8Tradecj;t ￿ skd
2
t
+ ￿9EMU11ij;t + ￿10EMU12ij;t + ￿11EMU21ij;t + ￿12EU12inij;t
+ ￿13EU12outij;t + ￿14ASFinij;t + ￿15ASFoutij;t + "ij;t
Lastly we come to the speci￿cation issue of controlling for common unobservable
time e⁄ects. The most ￿ exible speci￿cation, albeit not always e¢ cient, is yearly
dummy variables. However, in order to increase e¢ ciency but maintain maximum
￿ exibility we can restrict our regression by imposing a parametric speci￿cation in
the form of spline function, which is a kinked time trend, to control for common
unobservable time e⁄ects. We will see that inward FDI for our groups of interest
as well as our control group have a very similar time evolution at an aggregate
level. This leads us to believe that common time e⁄ects can be captured by a spline
speci￿cation and thereby increase the e¢ ciency of our regressions.17
5 Results
Before we enter the world of regressions, it is of interest to see if there are any
indications of a euro e⁄ect in the raw data. The sample of 18 OECD countries is
divided into the four previously mentioned groups: inward FDI ￿ ows between euro
countries (EMU 11) , inward FDI ￿ ows to euro countries from non-euro countries
(EMU 12), inward FDI ￿ ows to non-euro countries from euro countries (EMU 21)
and inward FDI ￿ ows between non-euro countries (EMU 22).
In Figure 1, where the Aver Corr series is used to measure FDI ￿ows in millions
of US dollars, we see that all categories evolve almost at the same rate until 1999,
when inward FDI drops for non-euro area countries, but continues upward for the
rest.18 It is clear from Figure 1 that inward FDI, for all the groups, follows a
non-linear development over time. Actually, a simple ￿tted exponential trendline is
able to explain 50-90 percent of the di⁄erent groups, while a linear trend line has
consistently 10 to 20 percent lower explanatory power. Figures 2 and 3 show the
relative development of our groups of interest (EMU 11, EMU 12 and EMU 21) in
absolute form. To wit, jskdj and jskdj ￿ jY dj:
17See Greene Ch. 8. For estimations and a discussion of the time controls in our case, see Appendix II.
18This increase occurs irrespective of the currency in which ￿ows are denominated and irrespective of who reports
the ￿ows, i.e. if we use in￿ows or out￿ows to measure inward FDI. The same is true when it comes to the empirical
estimations.
12terms of our control group (EMU 22) for di⁄erent time periods. It is clear that the
three euro-categories exhibit a sharp relative increase around 1998-1999. Also, the
spike exhibited in Figure 2, for 1996, is not due to any large increase in the three
groups of interest but rather due to large disinvestment in countries that belong in
group EMU 22. More precisely it is due to US disinvestment in Sweden and the UK
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Figure 2: Relative Inward FDI, of EMU-area groups Average Corrected Flows.
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Figure 3: Relative Inward FDI of EMU-area groups, Average Corrected Flows.
These ￿gures demonstrate two important facts. Firstly, the development of in-
ward FDI for the di⁄erent groups is very similar and, secondly, countries belonging
to the EMU area have experienced a large relative increase in inward FDI after the
introduction of the euro. However, even if this relative increase is clear in the raw
data we still have to examine the determinants of FDI in a multivariate context that
enables us to draw conclusions about partial e⁄ects of the euro.
5.1 Regressions
Table 3 contains the main results. Inward FDI is measured as the average of
in￿ ows and out￿ ows in millions of current US dollars. Panel I shows the results
from the gravity approach while Panel II presents the general equilibrium approach.
The raw results are expressed in millions of dollars and give as such not a sense
of magnitude but rather one of direction. However, since all estimated means are
positive we can obtain elasticities for the point estimates from the original estimation
by using the chain rule and gain hence a sense of magnitude as well. The fact that
the elasticity point estimates have a higher t-value, can be attributed to the fact that
the logarithmic form has a better "￿t". Three models are estimated, both in order
to gauge the di⁄erent approaches of the gravity-, the more ad hoc, and the general
equilibrium speci￿cation in general, but also in order to see whether speci￿cation
issues will a⁄ect our results concerning the e⁄ect of the euro on FDI in particular.
From the results below we see that the euro dummies are highly signi￿cant across
the spectrum of speci￿cations.
14Concentrating on the Gravity regression we see that, by far, the most important
determinant both in magnitude and signi￿cance is the variable for market size Yi.20
This is not a surprising result, since both at an empirical as well as a theoretical
level the variable of market size is considered the determinant for FDI.21 What is
a surprising feature in the regression though, is that the measure of the investing
country￿ s market size, Yj, is insigni￿cant. This is a result of the inclusion of the
measure for capital- or ￿nancing ability for the investing country, Stockj. This is
probably because size is acting as a proxy, albeit an imprecise one, for ￿nancing
ability.22
Our general equilibrium approach give somewhat similar results to those obtained
by CMM and BDH. Both the sum of GDP, as well as the squared di⁄erence of GDP,
variables capturing horizontal FDI, have the theoretically predicted signs and are
highly signi￿cant. The skill di⁄erence variables, skd and skd￿Y d, give support to the
vertical integration motivation within the theoretical framework of the knowledge
capital model. The interaction term of, Tradecj ￿skd2, has the opposite sign of the
predicted but as CMM puts it, "does not have a theoretically sharp hypothesis and,
indeed, empirical support for this term is weak" (pp. 699). Lastly, the regressors
measuring trade costs are both positive, which in light of their de￿nition, is the
expected sign.23
The most interesting result though, for our purpose here, is the impact of the euro
on FDI. Table 3 shows that inward FDI increases by 14￿16 percent approximately,
depending on model estimation, in the intra- EMU area (EMU 11). The increase
is certainly not trivial and is of equal magnitude to the increase in trade volume
found by Micco et al. (2003) as well as Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003). As with the
￿ndings on trade, the regressions show that there is evidence concerning positive
spillovers from EMU on partner countries, represented by EMU12 and EMU21.
The magnitudes of EMU12 and EMU21 are also non-trivial with an increase in
FDI in the former group of 8 percent, albeit signi￿cant only at the 10% level, and
the latter group by around 11 ￿ 13 percent.
20The investing countries￿real exchange rate is of equal magnitude but is not always signi￿cant, as shown in
Appendix III. Since it is not a variable of primary interest in this paper, we do not dwell on it here.
21See Chakrabarti (2001).
22Another interesting feature, though not reported, are the dummy variables for the creation of the European
common market in the regression that are negative and signi￿cant. It can be assumed that the creation of the EU
made some investment non-pro￿table due to the removal of trade barriers, since a similar investment somewhere
in the EU could service the entire market. These results are consistent with some results obtained by Flam and
Nordstr￿m (2003) where dummies for the creation of the EU tend to have a positive e⁄ect on exports from non-EU
countries to EU countries.
23Openess is de￿ned as exports+imports/GDP and proxy hence trade costs going both ways.
15Table 3: Panel I-Gravity Regressions
Dependent Variable: Inward FDI measured as:
Aver Corr In￿ows Out￿ows
Millions Elasticities Millions Elasticities Millions Elasticities
US dollars US dollars US dollars
Yi 0:006￿￿￿ 6:54￿￿￿ 0:006￿￿￿ 4:94￿￿￿ 0:006￿￿￿ 6:62￿￿￿
(4:34) (4:60) (3:56) (3:77) (3:46) (3:66)
Yj ￿0:003 ￿2:90 ￿0:002 ￿2:08 ￿0:005 ￿4:15
(1:46) (1:50) (0:95) (0:97) (1:17) (1:22)
Stockj 0:0006￿￿ 0:52￿￿ 0:0005￿ 0:43￿ 0:001￿ 0:76￿
(2:25) (2:30) (1:90) (1:95) (1:75) (1:84)
￿Stocki ￿0;82 ￿0:01 ￿2:12 ￿0:02 ￿1:73 ￿0:02
(0;49) (0:49) (0:46) (0:46) (0:92) (0:92)
Tradeci 24:55￿￿￿ 3:83￿￿￿ 29:06￿ 3:55￿￿ 18:13 2:77
(2:60) (2:62) (1:74) (1:77) (1:55) (1:54)
Tradecj ￿4:47 ￿0:69 ￿7:09 ￿0:95 ￿1:08 ￿0:15
(0:43) (0:43) (0:49) (0:49) (0:05) (0:05)
REXi ￿22:57 ￿1:86 ￿49:48 ￿3:45 ￿18:61 ￿1:47
(0:90) (0:91) (1:30) (1:32) (0:51) (0:51)
REXj 72:88￿ 1:87￿ 90:44 6:24￿ 64:85 5:17
(1:75) (1:83) (1:62) (1:67) (0:85) (0:89)
EMU 11 1616￿￿￿ 0:146￿￿￿ 2034:8￿￿￿ 0:173￿￿￿ 1795:9￿￿￿ 0:176￿￿￿
(3:17) (3:40) (2:82) (2:96) (2:71) (2:91)
EMU 12 1081￿ 0:075￿ 1687:6￿￿ 0:115￿￿ 1345:9 0:07
(1:74) (1:81) (2:09) (2:18) (1:05) (1:10)
EMU21 1503￿￿ 0:106￿￿ 1931:0￿￿ 0:09￿￿ 2051:9￿￿ 0:16￿￿
(2:44) (2:52) (2:03) (2:04) (2:32) (2:41)
Obs 2722 2092 2177
R2 0:35 0:39 0:28
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects and EU entry dummies not reported.
Splines are used to control for time as year e⁄ects. ￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at
the 10-, 5- and 1 % level respectively.
16Table 3: Panel II-General Equilibrium Regressions
Dependent Variable: Inward FDI measured as Aver Corr:
CMM BDH
Millions Elasticities Millions Elasticities
US dollars US dollars
Ysum 0:01￿￿￿ 20:40￿￿￿ 0:01￿￿￿ 20:67￿￿￿
(4:33) (4:79) (4:36) (4:84)
Y d2 ￿4e￿16￿￿￿ ￿2:88￿￿￿ ￿4e￿16￿￿￿ ￿2:87￿￿￿





skd ￿ Y d ￿0:0001 ￿0:24
(0:94) (0:94)
jskdj ￿ jY dj ￿0:0002￿ ￿0:70￿
(1:83) (1:88)
Tradeci 9:75 1:55 12:23 1:94
(1:23) (1:21) (1:57) (1:54)
Tradecj 40:03￿￿￿ 6:37￿￿￿ 37:68￿￿￿ 5:99￿￿￿
(4:63) (5:34) (4:59) (5:29)
Invci ￿204:8 ￿0:28 ￿9:10 ￿0:01
(0:34) (0:34) (0:01) (0:01)
Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:56￿￿ 0:65￿￿ 0:39 0:45
(2:33) (2:47) (1:49) (1:52)
EMU 11 1489￿￿￿ 0:134￿￿￿ 1488￿￿￿ 0:134￿￿￿
(2:90) (3:03) (2:85) (2:98)
EMU 12 1158￿ 0:08￿ 1101￿ 0:076￿
(1:72) (1:80) (1:65) (1:72)
EMU21 1752￿￿￿ 0:123￿￿￿ 1811￿￿￿ 0:128￿￿￿
(2:82) (2:91) (2:94) (3:04)
Obs 2802 2802
R2 0:35 0:35
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects and EU entry dummies not reported.
Splines are used to control for time as year e⁄ects. ￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at
the 10-, 5- and 1 % level respectively.
The results indicate that we can be fairly con￿dent of the positive e⁄ects the
creation of the EMU had on inward FDI. These positive e⁄ects are not only within
17the designated EMU area but also a⁄ects its partners. The results also suggest
that positive spillovers exist and that they go in both directions. The remainder
of the paper will use the Gravity regression and the Average Corrected FDI series
as a reference and if any of the other estimation speci￿cation have a signi￿cantly
di⁄erent e⁄ect on the results it will be duly noted.
6 Robustness check
In this section the robustness of the obtained results is checked to changes in
country and time sample.24 The ￿rst important issue is the question of whether
the results truly capture a euro e⁄ect or if it is something else. As mentioned
earlier, the euro can a⁄ect international investment through several channels. Some
of these channels can have a long transmission period and not have a direct impact,
while other e⁄ects could be anticipated in advance. The easiest way to do this is
to replace our EMU group variables with yearly dummies by group and plot their
point estimates. If it is a euro e⁄ect we capture it should be obvious through some
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Figure 4: Estimated E⁄ects of Yearly Euro Group Dummies.
Figure 4 depicts the estimated yearly e⁄ects of the various country groups. As we
24For space considerations only the results of the EMU variables will be presented in the tables. At a general
level the remaining explanatory variables sustain their signi￿cance throughout the robustness check.
18can see a sharp change occurs in 1999. From where the estimated yearly e⁄ects are
increasingly negative they are close to zero in 1999 and positive for the rest of the
years. Moreover we can clearly see that EMU12, exhibits a more cyclical behavior
for the period, which explains the low signi￿cance in the estimations. The ￿gure
also makes it clear that there is a jump in 1999 and not any other year, which makes
us con￿dent that what we are capturing in our estimations is a euro e⁄ect.25
Continuing the sensitivity analysis, we now check whether the EMU results are
driven by any particular country/countries, or whether they are more widespread.26
Countries are excluded both as receivers of investment and investors (i and j re-
spectively). The results presented in the table are the post estimation elasticities of
the EMU variables.
Table 4: Country sensitivity, single country exclusion
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Independent variables
EMU 11 EMU 12 EMU 21
Country dropped
None 0:146￿￿￿ (3:40) 0:075￿ (1:81) 0:106￿￿ (2:52)
Austria 0:148￿￿￿ (3:62) 0:079￿ (1:91) 0:115￿￿￿ (2:76)
BeLux￿ 0:06￿ (1:77) 0:05 (0:98) 0:08￿ (1:77)
Finland 0:156￿￿￿ (3:78) 0:084￿￿ (2:01) 0:117￿￿￿ (2:75)
France 0:117￿￿￿ (2:53) 0:084￿ (1:68) 0:08￿ (1:72)
Germany 0:085￿￿ (2:50) 0:04 (1:06) 0:093￿ (1:88)
Greece 0:145￿￿￿ (3:45) 0:075￿ (1:75) 0:102￿￿ (2:37)
Ireland 0:138￿￿￿ (3:43) 0:076￿ (7:84) 0:11￿￿￿ (2:62)
Italy 0:163￿￿￿ (3:89) 0:088￿￿ (2:07) 0:125￿￿￿ (2:92)
Netherlands 0:135￿￿￿ (2:85) 0:088￿ (1:84) 0:103￿￿ (2:13)
Portugal 0:153￿￿￿ (3:71) 0:083￿￿ (1:99) 0:119￿￿￿ (2:85)
Spain 0:144￿￿￿ (3:29) 0:078￿ (1:76) 0:12￿￿￿ (2:78)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis. ￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5-
and 1 % level respectively.￿ Economic entity of Belgium-Luxembourg
We see clearly from Table 4 that the exclusion of Belgium-Luxembourg (BeLux)
or Germany weakens the results. Further examination reveals that when both coun-
tries are excluded simultaneously the regressions do not show any euro e⁄ects, which
is perhaps not so surprising since we have removed the most central locations in the
euro area. Continuing however with this investigation we notice an important fea-
25The results concering time sensitivity are con￿rmed by more estimations in Appendix III Tables D1 and D2.
26The methodology of this experiment follows Micco et al. (2003), Table 6 and 7.
19ture, namely, that if BeLux and Germany are excluded only as receivers (country
i), or only as investors (country j) the results showing a positive e⁄ect for the intro-
duction of the euro remain signi￿cant. These results are important for two reasons.
Firstly, the aim of this paper is to investigate unidirectional FDI, hence the impor-
tance of examining the exclusion of FDI ￿ ows in only one direction, and secondly
these results clearly illuminate the fact that Belgium-Luxembourg and Germany act
as a hub for the EMU-area inward FDI but they are not the sole driving receivers
of FDI nor are they the sole driving investors. Table 5 presents some chosen results
on the EMU dummies that clarify the previously made point.
Table 5: Excluding Germany and BeLux
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Excluded as country: (i) and (j) (i) (j)
EMU 11 0:03 0:06￿ 0:09￿￿
(0:94) (1:76) (2:41)
EMU 12 ￿0:02 0:001 0:087
(0:47) (0:02) (1:59)
EMU 21 0:04 0:117￿￿ 0:05
(0:80) (2:12) (1:23)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 % level respectively.
Firstly, in all cases the intra-EMU (EMU 11) values decrease when Germany and
BeLux are excluded either as receivers or as investors. Secondly, they seem to be a
driving force of both attracting FDI from non-EMU countries, as well as investing
outside the euro area, since EMU 12 and EMU 21 become in turn insigni￿cant.
Hence what can be said about Germany and BeLux is that while they play a vital
role in the euro area for inward FDI (EMU 11) as well as for spillovers (EMU 12
and EMU 21) they do not explain the entire story. However, the results suggest the
need to take a closer look at these two entities.
From Table 6, we see that a large part of European FDI circle around Germany
and Belgium-Luxembourg. While the role of Germany is understandable, the entity
of BeLux raises some concerns. Closer investigation shows that the majority of FDI
to BeLux goes to Luxembourg and are special entity purposes (SPE￿ s) ￿ ows, i.e.
￿ ows used for ￿nancial intermediation and not production. Unfortunately there is
20no way to distinguish the intended end destinations in order to construct correct
country pairs. What is interesting though is that the large majority of FDI both to
and from BeLux concern "large" economies.
Table 6: The role of Germany and BeLux.
They Receive, % of Group. Invest, % of Group.
EMU 11 0:41 0:39
EMU 12 0:36
EMU21 0:45
FDI ￿ ows from and to BeLux. Million US $ 1999-2001.
From BeLux
To
Small Switzerl. Big non Euro Big Euro
Total 1999-2001. 56552 54820 107281 169392




Small Switzerl. Big non Euro Big Euro
Total 1999-2001. 47444 3707 137703 117492
average per year 1317 794 11475 7343
and country.
To conclude this section, we may reemphasize the fact that intra-EMU e⁄ects
retain their signi￿cance even when Germany and BeLux are excluded either as re-
ceivers of FDI or as investors. This provides more evidence that the positive e⁄ects
of the introduction of the euro in attracting FDI are widespread across the members
rather than more concentrated in some areas. This is a topic which will be further
investigated subsequently.27
7 On the Economic Geography of the Euro
In this section groups of countries will be excluded as receivers (country i) of FDI
or investors (country j) in order to check for any potential concentration of inward
FDI. The results obtained will be compared to similar regressions on unilateral
trade, measuring exports, where Exportij denotes exports from country i to country
27As we have seen, the magnitude varies of course, but the question is whether all members have had some e⁄ect
to a varying degree or if all e⁄ects are concentrated in some countries.
21j.28 The purpose here is twofold. Firstly, it will give an indication of whether the
introduction of the euro has induced any agglomeration e⁄ects on economic activity.
Agglomeration tendencies, or the lack thereof, are possibly important for policy in
any future EMU-members. Moreover, the direction of trade in conjunction with
the direction of FDI might be able to reveal something of the character of FDI.
That is, if the directions correspond to the notion of vertical or horizontal FDI or
neither of the above, keeping in mind that a signi￿cant percentage of world trade,
is intra￿rm.29 Secondly, this section can also be seen as being a continuation of the
robustness checks performed previously.
In the new trade literature, the focus is on the geographic distribution of economic
activity, where models display both forces of agglomeration as well as forces of
dispersion. One key factor encouraging agglomeration is the "market access e⁄ect".
It states that ￿rms tend to locate their production in the big market and export to
small markets.30 As we have seen from the CMM and BDH estimations the variables
capturing market size and symmetry (Y sum and Y d2) are signi￿cant determinants
of FDI.
As mentioned above, the "new economic geography" models feature forces of
both agglomeration as well as forces of dispersion. Their relative strengths are
determined by trade costs. Mostly these models show how lower trade costs may
lead to increased agglomeration of economic production. However, agglomeration
forces are, as a rule, hump shaped in their relation to trade costs and depending on
the starting point dispersion forces may dominate when trade ￿ feeness￿is increased.31
The introduction of the euro has had a signi￿cantly positive e⁄ect on trade volumes
and it can be seen as a step towards reducing such trade costs. Yet, since we are
not quite sure about our position on the hump prior to the introduction of the euro
we can not make any a priori assumptions about agglomeration e⁄ects.
Another way to look at is through strategies of MNE￿ s concerning locational
decisions. Indication exists that MNE￿ s have neither pure horizontal nor pure ver-
tical motivations for investment. They employ rather, so-called, complex strategies
regarding their locational decisions. From a theoretical as well as an intuitive per-
spective we should expect that, for large economies the decision to locate an FDI
28The dataset on exports is from the paper by Flam and Nordstr￿m (2003).
29According to Markusen (2002, Ch.1 pp. 5-6) about 30 to 40 percent of trade is intra￿rm, while in Blonigen
(2005) it is mentioned that as much as 47 percent of the U.S.￿ s trade with other countries was intra￿rm in 1999,
(pp. 1, footnote 1).
30See Baldwin et al. (2003).
31See Baldwin et al. (2003).
22there should be dominated by horizontal motivations, while the decision to locate to
a small economy should be dominated by vertical motivations. If this supposition
is true, we should observe that the euro e⁄ect for FDI is, at least, more signi￿cant
for the large economies, while the euro e⁄ect of trade is, at least, more signi￿cant
for the small economies.
Moving on to empirical considerations we can note that in order to compare our
results from exports and inward FDI, the datasets have to cover the same time period
and country sample.32 The division of the sample into "big" and "small" economies
is based on market size. The "big" sample of euro countries contains Germany,
France, Italy and Spain, while the remaining countries are found in the "small"
sample.33 The regressions are run by excluding the "big" or "small" group ￿rstly as
country i, i.e. as receivers of FDI and as exporters (Table 7.1) and subsequently as
country j, i.e. as investors and as receivers of exports (Table 7.2). Comparison of
the elasticities obtained in the case of exports is straightforward: we can compare
the group elasticities with their full sample counterparts and be able to discern
some pattern in the direction of trade. In the case of the FDI regressions it is not
so straightforward, since the elasticities obtained are calculated using the chain rule
and are applied to the predicted mean of the respective variable. They will however
give us an indication of direction concerning FDI.
Starting with the ￿rst three columns in Table 7.1 it is not clear, at ￿rst glance,
when comparing the estimates in regressions (1), (2) and (3) that "big" countries
receive more FDI ￿ ows. Both subsamples experience a seemingly equiproportional
increase. Remembering however the statistics concerning BeLux from Table 6 it is
not clear that the entity belongs in reality to the "small" sample. The large majority
of FDI come from and go to large economies, we simply can not match the exact
country pairs. Hence if BeLux acts only as a haven for ￿nancial intermediation, it
should for all practical reasons belong to the "big" sample. Regressions (4) and (5)
shows the results when BeLux switches sample. The results now indicate that a
large part of the inward FDI increase due to the EMU is concentrated in a few large
economies.34
32Exports for years other than 1992-2001 are dropped as well as FDI concerning Greece. Lastly, the euro dummies
have 1999 as their starting date.
33The baseline regressions for this exercise are: for inward FDI, as previously the gravity speci￿cation in Table 3
and for Exports, regression (6) in Table 4, in Flam￿ s and Nordstr￿m￿ s (2003) paper.
34We say a large part because not all FDI to and from BeLux concern "big" economies.
23Table 7.1: EMU elasticities of inward FDI and Exports, country (i)
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Receivers of FDI






EMU 11 0:146￿￿￿ 0:08￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:04 0:14￿￿￿
(3:40) (2:59) (2:68) (2:14) (3:78)
EMU 12 0:075￿ 0:05 0:05 0:01 0:09￿￿
(1:81) (1:39) (1:17) (0:56) (2:14)








EMU 11 0:14￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:13￿￿￿ 0:16￿￿￿ 0:13￿￿￿
(6:14) (5:50) (4:97) (4:51) (5:32)
EMU 12 0:07￿￿￿ 0:06￿￿ 0:09￿￿￿ 0:06￿￿ 0:09￿￿￿
(3:29) (2:51) (4:20) (2:11) (4:31)
Notes: Robust jtj -values in parenthesis.￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the
10-, 5- and 1 % level respectively.
a Excluding Germany, France, Italy and Spain
b Excluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, Netherlands and BeLux
c Excluding Germany, France, Italy, Spain and BeLux
dExcluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Netherlands
The results concerning exports in Table 7.1 di⁄er markedly from their FDI coun-
terparts. Firstly, we see that regressions (2) and (4) are virtually identical for
exports, which implies that BeLux does not drive any results when exports are
concerned. Secondly, for the intra- EMU area (EMU 11) the coe¢ cient rises con-
siderably, compared to the base regression, when the "big" sample is dropped as an
exporter, but falls when the "small" sample is dropped. Hence, the export increase
is larger for the "small" countries. For EMU 12 the opposite holds and the increase
is dominated by the big countries￿exports to non-EMU members.
We now turn our attention to the opposite side of this equation, namely where
do the FDI come from and to whom do the countries export to. In Table 7.2 we
see that when, BeLux changes sample, regressions (4) and (5), it is clear that the
"big" economies are the ones that spawn most of the FDI, both within the EMU-area
(EMU 11) as well as outside the same (EMU 21). On the other hand the regressions
dealing with the export side of this experiment show an equal clear tendency where
24the "large" economies receive larger part of the increase in exports both for EMU
11 as well as EMU 21.
Table 7.2: EMU elasticities of inward FDI and Exports, country (j)
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Source of FDI






EMU 11 0:146￿￿￿ 0:129￿￿￿ 0:08￿￿￿ 0:06￿ 0:144￿￿￿
(3:40) (2:83) (2:66) (1:97) (3:21)
EMU 21 0:106￿￿ 0:08￿ 0:07￿ 0:01 0:114￿￿￿
(2:52) (1:76) (1:93) (0:48) (2:75)








EMU 11 0:14￿￿￿ 0:11￿￿￿ 0:21￿￿￿ 0:09￿￿￿ 0:21￿￿￿
(6:14) (3:89) (8:97) (3:07) (8:93)
EMU 21 0:08￿￿￿ 0:04 0:13￿￿￿ 0:03 0:13￿￿￿
(3:63) (1:62) (5:85) (0:91) (5:78)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis. ￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the
10-, 5- and 1 % level respectively.
a Excluding Germany, France, Italy and Spain
b Excluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria, Netherlands and BeLux
c Excluding Germany, France, Italy, Spain and BeLux
d Excluding Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Austria and Netherlands.
Overall, the results from Tables 7.1 and 7.2 indicate that FDI ￿ ows concentrate
in the "big" economies. However, within the euro-area FDI also originate mostly
from the same countries. Exports, on the other hand, tend to increase more for
"small" countries and are directed towards "big" countries, with the exception of
euro-area exports to non-members, where the "big" members increase their exports
more to "big" non members.
So, are any agglomeration tendencies apparent from this exercise? The answer to
this is: only partially. It is a partial yes, since "big" economies attract a larger share
of the total increase in inward FDI, after controlling for a host of factors including
market size. Hence we observe an increase in the concentration of production and
25the sample displays agglomeration tendencies. However, exports tend to increase
slightly more for small countries, which may indicate an increase in production and,
in terms of economic geography, increased dispersion.
An interesting feature of the results is, however, the direction patterns of ex-
ports in conjuction with those of the FDI. These create two caveats. Firstly, it
may be that perhaps intra￿rm trade and vertical FDI increased in importance with
the introduction of the euro.35 Secondly, it may also be that the location deci-
sion of FDI is characterized by "third" country considerations and more attention
should be given to models such as Export-Platform FDI or complex versions of the
knowledge-capital model.36 These suspicions are supported by ￿ndings from Flam
and Nordstr￿m (2003) where they use regressions of one-digit SITC sector exports
and ￿nd that export increases are concentrated on di⁄erentiated and processed in-
put goods. Flam and Nordstr￿m note that the estimated increase for trade can
be explained by increasing vertical specialization along the lines suggested by Yi
(2003).
8 Conclusions
Several theoretical arguments exist as to why the introduction of the euro should
increase international investment. In this paper a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach
has been used in order to gauge the impact of the introduction of the euro on inward
FDI for the EMU members. After attempting to correct potential measurement
problems and for various time e⁄ects in the data we estimate that the introduction
of the euro has increased inward FDI by 14 ￿ 16 percent within the euro area.
Moreover, the euro has had signi￿cant positive spillover e⁄ects on inward FDI both
to and from the euro area by around 8 and 11￿13 percent, respectively. The results
are robust to changes in time and country sample with one exception. If the central
locations of Germany and Belgium-Luxembourg are excluded simultaneously as both
receivers of FDI and investors most of the euro e⁄ects disappear. However, if they
are excluded either as receivers or investors the euro e⁄ects reappear indicating that
the two countries act as a hub for FDI ￿ ows in the euro area. Finally, an investigation
of the economic geography of the euro is conducted by combining the inward FDI
results with results obtained from export regressions. The ￿ndings indicate that the
increase in FDI is concentrated to large economies, while the increase in exports is
35That vertical motivations play a part in the loacation of FDI is partly vindicated by the signs and signi￿cance
of the skill variables in the CMM and BDH speci￿cations.
36For the former see Ekholm et al. (2003) and for the latter see Baltagi et al. (2005) and Bloningen et al (2004).
26larger for small economies. From this exercise there is an indication of an increase
in vertical specialization or "third" country considerations in the sample.
However, we do not feel that any speci￿c model does an excellent job at explaining
the location of FDI, which raises some questions of relevance for future research. The
￿rst is directed to the question of whether alternative general equilibrium models
such as Export-Platform FDI are more informative. Second, for policy issues, there
will be a need to investigate whether "small" economies are increasingly acting as
suppliers of input goods to multinational enterprises that, in turn, are increasingly
located in "big" economies? If this is the case, it would be a natural step to inves-
tigate whether "small" economies are going to encounter a more volatile future in
their production when exogenous shocks hit the EMU area due to this vertical spe-
cialization and the implied supplier status. Moreover, the question arises of whether
such a development will impede further on the possibilities of "small" economies to
pursue independent policies?
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29APPENDIX I: Data description
Variable description
Source: Eurostat, New Cronos
Inward FDI ij Equity + Other Capital, netMillions current US $.
In￿ows Inward FDI for country i reported as an in￿ ow for i.
Out￿ows Inward FDI for country i reported as an out￿ ow for j.
Average Inward FDI for country i measured as the average
of above variables.
Corrections Extension of inward FDI dataset by correcting for missing
values when possible, for in￿ ows (out￿ ows) by using their
out￿ ow (in￿ ow) counterpart corrected by an average
asymmetry.
Source: IMF, IFS
REX i or j Real E⁄ective Exchange Rate Index, CPI Based
Y i or j GDP, Millions current US $
Source: Penn World Tables
Trade 1/Openess
Costs
Source: International Country Risk Guide
Investment Composite Index using Corruption, Bureaucracy
Costs and Rule of Law.
Source: Barro-Lee Database
Skill Average number of school years,￿ tyr￿variable.
Source: World Bank, WDI
Stock Market capitalization of listed companies share
price ￿ no. of shares outstandingMillions current US $
Dummy Variables
EMU 0 prior to the introduction of the Euro in 1999, 1 afterwards if
EMU 11 both countries i and j belong to the EMU.
EMU 12 country i belongs to the EMU and country j does not.
EMU 21 country j belongs to the EMU and country i does not.
EU 12 0 prior to 1993 and 1 afterwards if
EU 12 in country i belongs to EU 12 and country j is non EU
EU 12 out country j belongs to EU 12 and country i is non EU
Austria Sweden Finland 0 prior to 1995 and 1 afterwards if
ASF in country i belongs to ASF and country j is non EU
ASF out country j belongs to ASF and country i is non EU
30Countries in the sample
￿ Group 1, EMU members: Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
￿ Group 2, non-EMU members: Denmark, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, UK, USA.
Average asymmetries
Average asymmetries are used to calculate corrected series. For each year there
is a di⁄erence for reported aggregate in￿ ows and out￿ ows for a certain area. This
aggregate di⁄erence is used to correct missing data on in￿ ows(out￿ ows) between
two countries for a certain year, if their out￿ ow(in￿ ow) counterpart exists.
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Figure A1
APPENDIX II: FDI development
As mentioned in the paper, some results may vary depending on the measure
used for inward FDI. The ￿rst four diagrams show the development of FDI using
In￿ ows and Out￿ ows as well as the corrected series. The ￿fth diagram shows the
development of our groups of interest relative to the control group. The last diagram
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33APPENDIX III: Measurement, Speci￿cation and Robustness
Table A, Gravity regression, De￿nition of FDI and IV estimations
Dependent variable: Inward FDI, millions US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
In￿ ows IVin￿ ows Out￿ ows IVout￿ ows Average C
Yi 0:006￿￿￿ 0:004￿￿￿ 0:006￿￿￿ 0:004￿￿￿ 0:006￿￿￿
(3:56) (4:22) (3:46) (3:56) (4:34)
Yj ￿0:002 ￿0:003 ￿0:005 ￿0:001 ￿0:003
(0:95) (1:17) (1:17) (0:95) (1:46)
Stockj 0:0005￿ 0:001￿ 0:001￿ 0:0003￿ 0:0006￿￿
(1:90) (1:75) (1:75) (1:90) (2:25)
￿Stocki ￿2:12 ￿1:08 ￿1:73 ￿1:40 ￿0;82
(0:46) (0:92) (0:92) (0:46) (0;49)
Tradeci 29:06￿ 11:38 18:13 19:21￿ 24:55￿￿￿
(1:74) (1:55) (1:55) (1:74) (2:60)
Tradecj ￿7:09 ￿0:68 ￿1:08 ￿4:68 ￿4:47
(0:49) (0:05) (0:05) (0:49) (0:43)
REXi ￿49:48 ￿11:68 ￿18:61 ￿32:70 ￿22:57
(1:30) (0:51) (0:51) (1:30) (0:90)
REXj 90:44 40:71 64:85 59:77 72:88￿
(1:62) (0:85) (0:85) (1:62) (1:75)
EMU 11 2034:8￿￿￿ 1128:3￿￿￿ 1795:9￿￿￿ 1344:8￿￿￿ 1616￿￿￿
(2:82) (2:71) (2:71) (2:82) (3:17)
EMU 12 1687:6￿￿ 844:8 1345:9 1115:3￿￿ 1081￿
(2:09) (1:05) (1:05) (2:09) (1:74)
EMU21 1931:0￿￿ 1288￿￿ 2051:9￿￿ 1276:2￿￿ 1503￿￿
(2:03) (2:32) (2:32) (2:03) (2:44)
Obs: 2092 2722 2177 2722 2722
R2 0:39 0:28 0:28 0:36 0:35
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects not reported.
Common time e⁄ects: Splines
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
34Table B1:
Dependent variable: Inward FDI (Aver Corr), yearly dummies
Regressors Gravity Regressors CMM Regressors BDH
Yi 0:006￿￿￿ Ysum 0:01￿￿￿ Ysum 0:01￿￿￿
(4:48) (4:40) (4:41)
Yj ￿0:002 Y d2 ￿4:1e￿16￿￿￿ Y d2 ￿4:1e￿16￿￿￿
(1:15) (2:99) (2:98)
Stockj 0:0005￿ skd 683:1￿￿￿ jskdj 553:7￿
(1:94) (2:92) (1:84)
￿Stocki 0:08 skd ￿ Y d ￿0:0001 jskdj ￿ jY dj ￿0:0002￿
(0:05) (1:11) (1:85)
Tradeci 27:99￿￿￿ Tradeci 15:1￿￿ Tradeci 17:5￿￿￿
(3:35) (2:29) (2:60)
Tradecj 1:07 Tradecj 45:42￿￿￿ Tradecj 42:94￿￿￿
(0:09) (5:00) (4:93)
REXi ￿18:75 Invci ￿527:3 Invci ￿321:9
(0:71) (0:66) (0:39)
REXj 74:76￿ Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:50￿￿ Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:32
(1:66) (2:24) (1:27)
EMU 11 1275 EMU 11 1136 EMU 11 1124
(1:56) (1:39) (1:35)
EMU 12 632 EMU 12 699 EMU 12 631
(0:69) (0:74) (0:66)
EMU21 1050 EMU21 1275 EMU21 1325
(1:20) (1:41) (1:46)
Obs 2722 2802 2802
R2 0:36 0:36 0:36
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects and EU entry dummies not reported.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
35Table B2:
Dependent variable: Inward FDI (Aver Corr), No time controls
Regressors Gravity Regressors CMM Regressors BDH
Yi 0:006￿￿￿ Ysum 0:01￿￿￿ Ysum 0:01￿￿￿
(4:24) (4:30) (4:34)
Yj ￿0:004￿￿ Y d2 ￿4:1e￿16￿￿￿ Y d2 ￿4:1e￿16￿￿￿
(2:12) (2:99) (2:97)
Stockj 0:0007￿￿￿ skd 629:7￿￿￿ jskdj 607:5￿￿
(2:99) (2:68) (2:04)
￿Stocki 1:64 skd ￿ Y d ￿0:0001 jskdj ￿ jY dj ￿0:0002￿
(1:03) (0:73) (1:77)
Tradeci 17:38￿￿ Tradeci 6:48 Tradeci 9:71
(2:13) (0:91) (1:37)
Tradecj ￿14:38 Tradecj 35:50￿￿￿ Tradecj 33:88￿￿￿
(1:48) (4:37) (4:33)
REXi ￿13:35 Invci 610:7 Invci 729:1
(0:54) (0:90) (1:06)
REXj 83:21￿￿ Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:58￿￿ Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:37
(2:01) (2:50) (1:44)
EMU 11 1629:8￿￿￿ EMU 11 1077:4￿￿￿ EMU 11 1081:9￿￿￿
(4:30) (1:39) (2:71)
EMU 12 1084￿￿ EMU 12 784:9 EMU 12 729:1
(2:12) (1:34) (1:27)
EMU21 1477:3￿￿￿ EMU21 1452:9￿￿￿ EMU21 1495:0￿￿￿
(3:07) (2:83) (2:93)
Obs 2722 2802 2802
R2 0:35 0:35 0:35
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects and EU entry dummies not reported.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
Table A is a continuation in trying to discern di⁄erences in the way measurement
of inward FDI a⁄ect the results. One di⁄erence is that the use of in￿ ows gives
consistently about a 10 percent increase in explanatory power. Another is that
the signi￿cance of various explanatory variables di⁄er between the measurements.
Moreover, very little seems to change in regressions when the raw data are expanded.
We can note that the IV-estimations that are used in order to correct potential
36measurement errors are not very helpful. The instrumented variables take on entirely
the attributes of the instruments. That is, IV-in￿ ows (IV-out￿ ows) look, in terms of
signi￿cance and magnitude, very much like the regressions using out￿ ows (in￿ ows)
directly. Since no gain in consistency is apparent from the IV-estimations,37 the end
result is only loss of e¢ ciency that comes from using instruments. Lastly we can
note that regression using the corrected average series seems to inherit the signi￿cant
attributes from both in￿ ows as well as out￿ ows, a result that was a happy surprise
for once. This leads us, in the light of prior arguments, to believe it is to be preferred
for measurement issues.
Tables B1 and B2 give us interesting insights concerning time controls. In Table
B1 where yearly dummies are used in order to capture common time e⁄ects we can
note that the EMU variables are insigni￿cant. Comparing the estimates of the EMU
variables with those obtained in Table B2 where the EMU variables are signi￿cant,
we see that the point estimates of both equations are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent.
This leads us to believe that even if Table B1 has the most ￿ exible de￿nition, it
is not the most e¢ cient. From Figures 1, 2 and 3 presented in the text we may
easily ￿t common time trends to the development of FDI. We can thereby increase
the e¢ ciency in our estimations by imposing a functional form on our regression.
This is done in Table 3, where the main results are presented, where two splines are
introduced as a mean to cope with common time e⁄ects. Our ￿rst spline comes from
Figure 1 and is a simple quadratic exponential function which, as mentioned earlier,
explains ￿fty to ninety percent of the variables in Figure 1. The second spline comes
from Figures 2 and 3 and is linear until 1999 and increasing thereafter, in order to
control for any common structural breaks around that period. Since again the point
estimates of the regressions in Table 3 and Table B1 are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent,
we can conclude that by controlling for common time e⁄ects in an e¢ cient, albeit
restricted, manner the e⁄ects of the EMU on inward FDI become more pronounced.
In addition, both splines tend to be highly signi￿cant as a rule, even if not reported.
37Hausman tests reject the use of instruments in this case. The null of no di⁄erence in estimates cannot be
rejected with ￿2 values of 0:91 and 0:67.
37Table C1
Dependent variable:Log Inward FDI
Regressors Gravity Regressors CMM Regressors BDH
logYi 0:30 logYsum 4:12￿￿￿ logYsum 4:12￿￿￿
(0:34) (3:75) (3:81)
logYj 1:51 logY d2 ￿0:045 logY d2 ￿0:18￿
(1:49) (0:46) (1:60)
logStockj 0:11 skd 0:37￿￿￿ jskdj ￿0:31￿
(1:19) (3:74) (1:69)
￿Stocki ￿0:001 skd ￿ Y d 8:7e￿9 logjskdj ￿ jY dj 0:308￿￿
(1:00) (0:32) (2:36)
Tradeci 0:001 Tradeci 0:0001 Tradeci 0:001
(0:55) (0:04) (0:35)
Tradecj 0:001 Tradecj 0:0001 Tradecj 0:0001
(0:48) (0:49) (0:05)
REXi 0:02 Invci ￿0:42 Invci ￿0:44
(0:32) (1:48) (1:56)
REXj 0:02 Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:0001￿ Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:0002￿￿
(0:29) (1:69) (2:03)
EMU 11 0:39￿￿ EMU 11 0:49￿￿￿ EMU 11 0:47￿￿￿
(2:55) (3:40) (3:19)
EMU 12 0:18 EMU 12 0:26￿ EMU 12 0:22
(1:09) (1:65) (1:41)
EMU21 0:50￿￿ EMU21 0:56￿￿￿ EMU21 0:61￿￿￿
(3:08) (3:54) (3:87)
Obs 2171 2234 2234
R2 0:78 0:78 0:78
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects and EU entry dummies not reported. Splines are used
to control for time as year e⁄ects. ￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
38Table C2
Dependent variable: Log Inward FDI, Heckman two step estimations
Regressors Gravity Regressors CMM Regressors BDH
logYi 1:29 logYsum 2:99 logYsum 3:58￿
(0:64) (1:56) (1:92)
logYj 1:12 logY d2 0:019 logY d2 ￿0:08
(0:85) (0:11) (0:40)
logStockj ￿0:05 skd 0:28￿ jskdj ￿0:28
(0:31) (1:74) (0:96)
￿Stocki 0:0003 skd ￿ Y d 4:4e￿8 logjskdj ￿ jY dj 0:19
(0:12) (0:81) (0:97)
Tradeci 0:0002 Tradeci ￿0:001 Tradeci 0:0001
(0:05) (0:21) (0:02)
Tradecj 0:0008 Tradecj 0:001 Tradecj 0:0004
(0:26) (0:40) (0:16)
REXi 0:003 Invci ￿0:14 Invci ￿0:21
(0:36) (0:32) (0:45)
REXj 0:004 Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:0001 Tradecj ￿ skd2 0:0002
(0:52) (1:10) (1:25)
EMU 11 0:46￿ EMU 11 0:45￿ EMU 11 0:41￿
(1:91) (1:94) (1:82)
EMU 12 0:197 EMU 12 0:26 EMU 12 0:24
(0:86) (1:14) (1:05)
EMU21 0:71￿￿￿ EMU21 0:68￿￿ EMU21 0:70￿￿￿
(2:67) (2:55) (2:69)
Obs 2097 2124 2124
Wald ￿ ￿2 1891 1875 1928
Mills ￿ ￿ ￿2:05 ￿2:07 ￿2:04
First step probit
c 0:76￿￿￿ 0:77￿￿￿ 0:77￿￿￿
(21:75) (22:15) (22:15)
Fdiin 0:001￿￿￿ 0:001￿￿￿ 0:001￿￿￿
(11:60) (11:57) (11:57)
LR ￿ ￿2 223:4 221:9 221:9
Notes: jz-valuesj in parenthesis, Fixed e⁄ects and EU entry dummies not reported. Splines are
used to control for time. ￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
39Tables C1 and 2 try to address issues of skewness and kurtosis in the data by
logging the non-index variables. However, this is not without problems. Firstly we
loose information by deleting all FDI that are negative due to disinvestment. This
might not be a serious issue though, since even if we drop the negative data and run
the regressions in levels the results do not change. Secondly, as we can see from the
Tables, variables that are deemed crucial FDI determinants simply do not matter
anymore. Moreover, the EMU dummies continue to be signi￿cant and positive but
have really large values. A note is due to the Heckman two-step approach. First, it
relies heavily on having the correct model in order to be estimated and the above
results indicate strongly that this is not the case, the results do not change if we use
the explanatory variables as the ￿rst step probit. Second, the Heckman selection
model is used if there is an issue of selection, i.e., whether to make an investment
or not and subsequently to investigate the magnitude, which is not a question we
try to answer here. All these results in conjunction tends us towards the conclusion
that the issue of skewness and kurtosis is not a primary one. It is rather that no
model is correctly speci￿ed in order to address the issue and it is most probable
that we su⁄er from omitted variables. This gives perhaps an additional dimension
on the importance of developing and testing alternative theories as well as empirical
speci￿cations concerning the location of FDI.
Table D1: EMU e⁄ect over time, changing starting date.
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
EMU starting date:
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
EMU 11 ￿0:01 ￿0:003 0:02 ￿0:01 0:02 0:08￿￿
(0:11) (0:04) (0:19) (0:16) (0:42) (2:24)
EMU 12 0:12 0:04 0:014 ￿0:02 ￿0:01 0:03
(0:95) (0:66) (0:25) (0:37) (0:25) (0:58)
EMU 21 ￿0:06 ￿0:04 ￿0:01 0:001 0:02 0:06
(0:40) (0:55) (0:10) (0:01) (0:39) (1:50)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
40Table D2: Time sensitivity
Dependent variable: Inward FDI
Sample starting at:
1993 1994 1995 1996
EMU 11 0:167￿￿￿ 0:169￿￿￿ 0:174￿￿￿ 0:178￿￿￿
(3:77) (3:39) (3:55) (3:29)
EMU 12 0:08￿ 0:08￿ 0:09￿ 0:08￿
(1:91) (1:78) (1:89) (1:66)
EMU 21 0:12￿￿￿ 0:12￿￿￿ 0:13￿￿￿ 0:14￿￿￿
(2:70) (2:55) (2:73) (2:63)
Notes: Robust jt-valuesj in parenthesis.
￿;￿￿ ;￿￿￿ denote signi￿cance at the 10-, 5- and 1 %-level respectively.
Tables D1 and D2 simply con￿rm the time sensitivity analysis obtained by ￿ eye-
ball￿econometrics from Figure 4. By changing the date of the euro creation dummy
and running our gravity style regression again, we can observe the signi￿cance of
the dummy variables. If we truly capture a euro e⁄ect, we should observe a jump
around the formal creation in 1999. For example, Micco et al. (2003), Flam and
Nordstr￿m (2003) ￿nd that for trade, the euro has been anticipated and positive
results start to show in 1998. The results displayed are the post estimation elas-
ticities of the EMU variables. Also, the time aspect of the robustness check also
requires a shortening of the time period prior to the EMU in order to check that the
estimated e⁄ects are not obtained due to any sample selection bias. The elasticities
of the EMU variables obtained from the regressions, where the pre-euro time period
is shortened, are stable in terms of signi￿cance, with a slight in￿ ation when the
pre-EMU period is shortened.
41  42  43
BANK OF GREECE WORKING PAPERS 
  
21. Kapopoulos, P. and S. Lazaretou, "Does Corporate Ownership Structure Matter 
for Economic Growth? A Cross - Country Analysis", March 2005. 
 
22. Brissimis, S. N. and T. S. Kosma, "Market Power Innovative Activity and 
Exchange Rate Pass-Through", April 2005. 
 
23. Christodoulopoulos, T. N. and I. Grigoratou, "Measuring Liquidity in the Greek 
Government Securities Market", May 2005. 
 
24. Stoubos, G. and I. Tsikripis, "Regional Integration Challenges in South East 
Europe: Banking Sector Trends", June 2005.    
 
25. Athanasoglou, P. P., S. N. Brissimis and M. D. Delis, “Bank-Specific, Industry-
Specific and Macroeconomic Determinants of Bank Profitability”, June 2005.   
 
26. Stournaras, Y., “Aggregate Supply and Demand, the Real Exchange Rate and Oil 
Price Denomination”, July 2005. 
 
27. Angelopoulou, E., “The Comparative Performance of Q-Type and Dynamic 
Models of Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence from the UK”, September 2005. 
 
28. Hondroyiannis, G., P.A.V.B. Swamy, G. S. Tavlas and M. Ulan, “Some Further 
Evidence on Exchange-Rate Volatility and Exports”, October 2005.      
 
29. Papazoglou, C., “Real Exchange Rate Dynamics and Output Contraction under 
Transition”, November 2005. 
 
30. Christodoulakis, G. A. and E. M. Mamatzakis, “The European Union GDP 
Forecast Rationality under Asymmetric Preferences”, December 2005.  
 
31. Hall, S. G. and G. Hondroyiannis, “Measuring the Correlation of Shocks between 
the EU-15 and the New Member Countries”, January 2006. 
 
32. Christodoulakis, G. A. and S. E. Satchell, “Exact Elliptical Distributions for 
Models of Conditionally Random Financial Volatility”, January 2006. 
 
33. Gibson, H. D., N. T. Tsaveas and T. Vlassopoulos, “Capital Flows, Capital 
Account Liberalisation and the Mediterranean Countries”, February 2006. 
 
34. Tavlas, G. S. and P. A. V. B. Swamy, “The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and 
Inflation Expectations: Re-specification and Interpretation”, March 2006.  
 
35. Brissimis, S. N. and N. S. Magginas, “Monetary Policy Rules under 
Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations”, March 2006. 
 
36. Kalfaoglou, F. and A. Sarris, “Modeling the Components of Market Discipline”, 
April 2006. 
   44
37. Kapopoulos, P. and S. Lazaretou, “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Greek Firms”, April 2006. 
 
38. Brissimis, S. N. and N. S. Magginas, “Inflation Forecasts and the New Keynesian 
Phillips Curve”, May 2006. 
 
39. Issing, O., “Europe’s Hard Fix: The Euro Area”, including comments by Mario I. 
Blejer and Leslie Lipschitz, May 2006. 
 
40. Arndt, S. W., “Regional Currency Arrangements in North America”, including 
comments by Steve Kamin and Pierre L. Siklos, May 2006. 
 
41. Genberg, H., “Exchange-Rate Arrangements and Financial Integration in East 
Asia: On a Collision Course?”, including comments by James A. Dorn and Eiji 
Ogawa, May 2006. 
 
42. Christl, J., “Regional Currency Arrangements: Insights from Europe”, including 
comments by Lars Jonung and the concluding remarks and main findings of the 
workshop by Eduard Hochreiter and George Tavlas, June 2006. 
 
43. Edwards, S., “Monetary Unions, External Shocks and Economic Performance: A 
Latin American Perspective”, including comments by Enrique Alberola, June 
2006. 
 
44. Cooper, R. N., “Proposal for a Common Currency Among Rich Democracies” 
and Bordo, M. and H. James, “One World Money, Then and Now”, including 
comments by Sergio L. Schmukler, June 2006. 
 
45. Williamson, J., “A Worldwide System of Reference Rates”, including comments 
by Marc Flandreau, August 2006. 
 
46. Brissimis, S. N., M. D. Delis and E. G. Tsionas, “Technical and Allocative 
Efficiency in European Banking”, September 2006. 
 
47. Athanasoglou, P. P., M. D. Delis and C. K. Staikouras, “Determinants of Bank 
Profitability in the South Eastern European Region”, September 2006. 
 
 